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Parliamentary Democracy and International Treaties*  
Robert Schütze 
 
 
Abstract  
Classic constitutional thought has considered the power to conclude international treaties 
to fall within the executive’s exclusive domain. But this nineteenth-century logic hardly 
convinces in the twenty-first century. For the function of international treaties has 
dramatically shifted from the military to the regulatory domain; and in the wake of this 
“new internationalism”, the traditional divide between “internal” and “external” affairs 
has increasingly disappeared. Has this enlarged scope of the treaty power also trigger a 
transformation of its nature; and in particular: has the rise of “legislative” international 
treaties been compensated by a greater role accorded to parliaments? This article explores 
this question comparatively by looking at the constitutional law of the United States and 
the European Union. Within the United States, international treaties were traditionally 
concluded under a procedure that excluded the House of Representatives; yet with the 
rise of the Congressional-Executive-Agreement in the twentieth century, this democratic 
deficit has been partially remedied. We indeed find a similar evolution within the context 
of the European Union, where an increasing “parliamentarisation” of the treaty power 
has taken place. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
* This is a significantly shortened and revised version of Chapter 11 of my “Foreign Affairs and the EU 
Constitution” (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
Traditionally, foreign affairs are non-parliamentary affairs: the right to wage war and to 
make peace were seen as part of the royal prerogative; and since the treaty power was 
perceived as an appendage to the right of war (Haggenmacher, 1991) it was “naturally” 
considered to belong to the executive power. For Blackstone, it thus fell into “the king’s 
prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes”. 
“Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally 
delay, resist, or annul.” The sole check on executive abuses was “parliamentary 
impeachment” of those ministers that had (mis)advised to conclude a treaty (Blackstone 
1899: 223-4). This view was widely shared in eighteenth century philosophical circles. 
Even the messiah of popular sovereignty did admit that “[t]he external exercise of power 
does not befit the People; the great maxims of State are not within its grasp” (Rousseau, 
2007: 252).1 
This reasoning seems much less persuasive today than several hundred years ago. For the 
internationalization of trade and commerce in the nineteenth century has added a new 
foreign affairs “occupation”: regulatory international agreements. The amount of tariffs 
for goods needed to be regulated; river navigation had to be coordinated; and intellectual 
property rights required to be protected. And with the rise of the international commercial 
treaty, the idea of the treaty-making power as an exclusive part of the executive branch 
became doubtful. These doubts led Alexander Hamilton – a “founding father” of the 
United States – to place the treaty power in between the rival claims of the executive and 
legislative department (Hamilton, 2007: 365): “The power in question seems therefore to 
form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the 
executive.” But while Hamilton’s recommendation of a “fourth power” was not to be 
taken up by modern constitutionalism, his concern for the “particular nature of the 
power of making treaties” has remained a pressing constitutional question ever since.  
For the transformation of the international treaty into a “regulatory” instrument did not 
pass unnoticed. National parliaments gradually realized that their hard-won internal 
                                                        
1 J.-J. Rousseau (2007: 252) famously writes: “L’exercice extérieur de la puissance ne convient point au 
peuple ; les grandes maximes d’État ne sont pas à sa portée ; il doit s’en rapporter là-dessus à ses chefs qui, 
toujours plus éclairés que lui sur ce point, n’ont guère intérêt à faire au-dehors des traités désavantageux à 
la patrie ; l’ordre veut qu’il leur laisse tout l’éclat extérieur et qu’il s’attache uniquement an solide.” However, 
it is important to bear in mind that for Rousseau democracy in this context meant direct democracy – not 
parliamentary democracy.  
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prerogatives to co-decision could be undermined by the monarch’s power over external 
affairs. Benjamin Constant – the great constitutional thinker of the French restoration – 
thus urged (Constant, 1837: 78 – my translation): “In light of the royal prerogative in 
treaty making, if the royal power could bind a people to clauses that affected its internal 
affairs, no constitution could subsist. … [A]ll constitutional rules could be amended 
without discussion and with a stroke of a pen. Despotism and persecution, disguised as 
peace treaties, would return from abroad; and the king’s ambassadors would be the real 
legislature of such a people.” And in light of this danger to democracy, national 
parliaments were – unsurprisingly – eager to extend their rights of co-decision from the 
internal to the external sphere. Nineteenth century constitutionalism consequently 
witnessed first attempts to (partially) parliamentarise the treaty power;2 yet the demand to 
democratize the treaty power would only gained momentum in the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless: the democratic credentials of the treaty power still represent an unresolved 
constitutional question today: for even modern constitutionalism accepts – otherwise 
unacceptable – limits on parliamentary democracy when it comes to the conclusion of 
international treaties.  
What are these constitutional limits; and what are their underlying reasons? This article 
explores these questions by analyzing the democratic credentials of the treaty power in 
the United States and the European Union. Our answers will of course depend on the 
type of standard(s) we employ; and we shall here use two comparative standards – one 
internal, the other external. The internal standard tells us how “democratic” the treaty 
power is in comparison with the legislative procedures within a domestic constitutional 
order, whereas the external standard evaluates how “democratic” the American treaty 
power is in comparison with the European treaty power (and vice versa). Section 1 starts 
with an analysis of the U.S. treaty power in light of the internal standard offered by the 
domestic democratic order, and Section 2 will do the same for the EU treaty power. A 
Conclusion will finally – briefly – compare the respective democratic credentials of the 
United States and the European Union by using each other’s external point of view.   
 
                                                        
2 The 1831 Belgian Constitution – a model for many constitutional monarchies in its time – thus required 
the king to obtain the assent of the Belgian parliament for certain classes of treaties; and the idea of 
coordinating the treaty power with the legislative power also informed the 1871 German Imperial 
Constitution. The 1871 German Imperial Constitution here provided in its Article 11 (3) as follows: 
“Insoweit die Verträge mit fremden Staaten sich auf solche Gegenstände beziehen, welche nach Artikel 4 
in den Bereich der Reichsgesetzgebung gehören, ist zu ihrem Abschluß die Zustimmung des Bundesrates 
und zu ihrer Gültigkeit die Genehmigung des Reichstages erforderlich.”  
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 1. The “Treaty Power” in the United States  
 
Nowhere is the text of the U.S. Constitution more laconic and obscure than in the 
context of foreign affairs (Ramsey, 2009); and this textual “minimalism” is acute for the 
treaty power. The sole provision on the conclusion of international treaties by the Union 
is here Article II. Dealing with the powers of the President, it states: “He shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur” (emphasis added). The exclusion of the U.S. 
“parliament” – the House of Representatives – was, in light of the “monist” stance of the 
U.S. Constitution vis-à-vis international treaties,3 surprising and unique. What were the 
reasons for this un-democratic solution? Section 1(a) will explore this question, before 
we investigate the arrangements of the “New Internationalism” that followed the “New 
Deal” in Section 1(b). This new internationalism generated a new instrument: the 
Congressional-Executive Agreement; yet as Section 1(c) will show, the rise of (sole) 
executive agreements has partly overshadowed this democratic development.  
 
 
a. Article II Treaties with the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate 
 
When the U.S. Constitution was drafted, the treaty power was one of the few provisions 
not subject to prolonged philosophical scrutiny. The framers had originally allocated it to 
the Senate alone, but the Constitutional Convention had added the President at the last 
minute. This “mixed” solution corresponded to the federal character of the American 
                                                        
3 Where a constitution chooses a monist philosophy towards international law, international law will be 
automatically part of national law. The U.S. Constitution has chosen such a monistic path through its 
Article VI – Section 2 (emphasis added): “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby[.]” By 
contrast, the dualist theory insists that international law and domestic law are two completely separate legal 
orders.  Dualist theory thereby reconciled the rival claims of national parliaments and the royal executive 
by splitting the concept of sovereignty into an internal and an external sphere. The refusal to acknowledge 
the direct parliamentary participation in the conclusion of international agreements “saved” the appearance 
of the monarch as the sole external representative of the nation. The royal sovereign could continue to be 
seen as vested with undivided external sovereignty.  
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Union, since it combined the “international” Senate – representing the States – with a 
“national” President. Article II thereby tied the conclusion of international treaties to the 
advice and consent of a qualified majority of States: two-thirds of the Senators would 
need to approve a treaty. This supermajority was a significant political safeguard of 
federalism (McClendon, 1931)..  
How was an Article II treaty to be negotiated and concluded? The framers originally 
envisaged both the President and the Senate to be actively involved in the negotiation of 
treaties. For the Senate, this was the idea behind the phrase “advice and consent” 
(emphasis added). However: a first encounter with an advising Senate already proved too 
much for the Presidency;  and American constitutionalism soon came to consider the 
power of external representation and treaty negotiation to fall within the exclusive 
domain of the executive: “[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude[.]” (US Supreme Court, 
1936: 319). American constitutional practice has thus reduced senatorial “advice and 
consent” to mere “consent” (Henkin, 1996: 177). The President – or his appointed 
officers – will thus solely initiate, conduct and conclude the negotiation of an 
international treaty. And the presidential prerogative “carries with it an absolute veto 
over international lawmaking” (Hathaway, 2009-10: 209).  
Where the President has negotiated a treaty, it must be referred to the Senate for 
consent. But where is the House of Representatives in the conclusion of Article II 
treaties? The House is not formally involved; and its exclusion from the treaty power has 
been explained as follows (Hamilton, 2007: 366-7 – emphasis added): “Accurate and 
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the 
same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and 
despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The very 
complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many 
different bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon 
the House of Representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep 
them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a 
source of so great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to condemn the project.” The House was 
therefore excluded on the belief that parliamentary involvement was simply not suitable 
to the business of international affairs.  
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b. Article I: The (Ex Post) Congressional-Executive Agreement 
 
While the House has no constitutional rights under Article II, the U.S. Constitution 
nonetheless recognizes congressional foreign affairs powers under Article I. It is thus 
Congress – not the President – that is competent “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations” (Article I – Section 8, Clause 3), to define and punish “Offences against the 
Law of Nations” (Article I – Section 8, Clause 10), and “[t]o declare War” (Article I – 
Section 8, Clause 11). Would these “legislative” powers include the external power to 
conclude international agreements with foreign States? Could Congress, with the 
assistance of the President, conclude international agreements outside the treaty-making 
procedure under Article II?  
This distinction between “treaties” and “agreements” was indeed eventually developed, 
especially after the “New Deal” era (Ackermann & Golove, 1995), even if constitutional 
traditionalists have ferociously attacked this position (Borchard, 1944). Yet despite more 
recent doubts surrounding the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the constitutionality of the so-called congressional-executive agreement has 
been firmly established. In parallel to the “treaty-making procedure” in Article II, U.S. 
constitutionalism has thus recognized an “agreement-making procedure” in Article I. 
Congressional agreements are here concluded under the “ordinary” legislative procedure 
set out in that Article I – Section 7 for internal legislation. This gives the House of 
Representatives an equal share, with the Senate, in the conclusion of international 
agreements. “[T]he congressional-executive agreement avoids lawmaking by less than a 
full, democratic legislature” (Henkin, 1990: 60).  
While less difficult a procedure with regard to the Senate (there is no need for a two-
thirds majority), the Article I procedure had added a new procedural hurdle: the inclusion 
of the House. And to make approval by the latter easier, Congress accepted – from 1974 
to 2007 – a “fast-track procedure” for international trade agreements.4 In essence: in 
exchange for consultation powers during the negotiation, Congress here agreed not to 
                                                        
4 The “fast track” procedure was first provided for in the 1974 Trade Act. It was renewed in 1979, 1984, 
1988, 1993 (expired: 1994). After an “interregnum” between 1994-2002, the 2002 Trade Act reintroduced 
the procedure, albeit under a different name: the “Trade Promotion Authority”.  
7 
 
suggest amendments to the agreement. Through this compromise, Congress thus gained 
a power to “advice” the President during the negotiations; yet it partly lost its power to 
“consent”. This pragmatic choice has nonetheless an “undemocratic” side effect. For it 
reduces the parliamentary prerogative of co-decision to a passive consent. For the House 
(and the Senate) will only be voting on the agreement en bloc. Under the Obama 
Administration, the fast-track procedure was recently given a new lease of life with the 
2015 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015. The 
latter was seen as instrumental for the conclusion of the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
presently negotiated with the European Union. The future of both international trade 
treaties seems however highly uncertain in light of President-elect Trump’s 
announcement to withdraw from both international agreements.5 
 
 
c. Executive Agreements: Presidential Unilateralism – Old and Modern 
 
Since its earliest days, U.S constitutional thought has allowed the President to conclude 
“agreements” under his own constitutional authority (Ramsey, 1998: 138). With time, it 
was equally accepted that an Article II treaty could delegate power to the President to 
conclude “executive agreements”. And today, the “vast majority” of U.S. international 
agreements are indeed concluded by the President under delegated powers (Hathaway, 
2009-10: 149). Under these so-called ex ante congressional-executive agreements 
Congress simply delegates “its” powers to the President who will subsequently conclude 
the agreement.  
Are there constitutional limits to a delegation of treaty-making powers? The delegation of 
such powers to the President was famously challenged in Field v Clark (US Supreme 
Court, 1892). Yet the Supreme Court unequivocally backed the idea of wide presidential 
powers: “[I]t is often desirable, if not essential, for the protection of the interests of our 
people against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign 
governments, in the interest of their people, to invest the President with large discretion in 
matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations” (ibid., 
                                                        
5 Financial Times, 22 November 2016: “Trump vows to renounce Pacific trade deal on first day in 
office“. 
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691 – emphasis added). This was confirmed in in Curtiss-Wright (US Supreme Court, 
1936), where the Court clarified that “the international field must often accord to the 
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved” (ibid., 320 – emphasis added). For foreign 
affairs, this de-activated the non-delegation doctrine from the start. No evidence could 
be more telling than the – peculiar – executive conclusion of 1947 GATT.6   
 
 
 
2.  The “Treaty Power” in the European Union 
 
The Union legal order adopts – like the United States – a monist view vis-à-vis 
international treaties (Schütze, 2014: 343); and a Union treaty will be generally treated like 
Union legislation. What are the democratic credentials behind this form of “external 
legislation”? The central treaty-making procedure within the European Union can today 
be found in Article 218 TFEU. Under this procedure, the central institution in the 
making of Union treaties is the Council of Ministers. The latter embodies – like the U.S. 
Senate – the federal principle in the form of the Member States; and like its American 
counterpart, the Council thereby acts – as a rule – by a qualified majority. What, then, is 
the role of the European Parliament? When the Union was founded, the democratic 
nature of the EU treaty power(s) was as deficient as its scope was minimal. This has 
however significantly changed over time; and with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, the treaty 
power of the European Union has – with the exception of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) – been significantly “democratised”.  
 
 
a. The “Ordinary” Treaty Procedure: Article 218 TFEU 
 
                                                        
6 The old 1947 GATT had never been submitted to the Senate nor to Congress. American adherence 
originally rested on the “Protocol of Provisional Application”. The latter had been signed and proclaimed 
by President Truman under powers delegated by the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (as amended in 
1945). This choice in favour of a “presidential” executive agreement was highly controversial. For an 
excellent apologia of the executive route, see: Jackson, 1967-68.  
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Article 218 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
acknowledges the central role of the Council in all stages of Union treaty-making: “The 
Council shall authorize the opening of negotiations, adopt negotiating directives, 
authorize the signing of agreements and conclude them.” The provision here guarantees 
the Council an indirect role in the negotiation and a direct role in the conclusion of Union 
agreements. Yet despite these primary roles, Article 218 TFEU still requires the 
participation of other constitutional actors than the Council in various procedural stages; 
and the provision thereby distinguishes between the initiation and negotiation of the 
agreement, and its signing and conclusion. The Union executive completely dominates 
the first stage, while the second stage involves the European legislature.  
Who may propose and who may negotiate Union agreements? Under Article 218 (3) 
TFEU, the Commission holds the exclusive right to make recommendations for 
agreements, except “where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to 
the common foreign and security policy”. In the latter case, the right of recommendation 
belongs to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. On a 
recommendation, the Council may then decide to open negotiations; and where it 
decides to do so, it must nominate the Union negotiator “depending on the subject 
matter of the agreement envisaged”. Where is the European Parliament? Parliament is 
indeed not formally allowed to propose a new Union treaty, nor is it directly involved in 
the negotiation. However, Article 218 (10) TFEU has now constitutionalised its right to 
be fully informed during all stages of the procedure. This constitutional prerogative has 
been given concrete content through an inter-institutional agreement between the 
Commission and the Parliament.  
The Council shall conclude the agreement on behalf of the Union on a proposal by the 
negotiator. But prior to that conclusion, the European Parliament might have to be 
involved. The rules on parliamentary participation in the conclusion of Union treaties are 
set out in Article 218(6) TFEU. The provision thereby distinguishes between two forms 
of parliamentary participation: consent and consultation. The latter constitutes the 
residual category and applies to all agreements that do not require consent.  
But what classes of international treaties require parliamentary consent? These classes of 
international agreements are enumerated in the form of five situations. The first, second 
and third category may be explained by the constitutional idea of “political treaties”. For 
association agreements as well as institutional agreements – and in particular: the 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – will by definition express an 
important political choice with long-term consequences. With regard to these international 
treaties Parliament – the representative of the European citizens – must give its 
democratic consent. The demand for parliamentary consent equally applies to a fourth 
class of international treaties: “agreements with important budgetary implications for the 
Union” due to the special role the European Parliament enjoys in shaping the Union 
budget. But most importantly: Article 218 (6) (a) (v) expands the parliamentary consent 
requirement to all EU agreements that concern policy areas that internally require 
parliamentary consent; and with this fifth class of agreement, parliamentary consent has 
become the constitutional rule within the European Union! 
 
 
b. In Particular: CFSP Agreements and the European Parliament   
 
The conclusion of CFSP agreements did originally follow its own “specific” procedure. 
Formally, this changed with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty following which CFSP agreements 
are henceforth also concluded under the general treaty-making procedure set out in 
Article 218 TFEU. Substantially, however, the conclusion of CFSP agreements has 
remained “special”.  
This CFSP “specificity” finds its strongest expression in the complete lack of direct 
parliamentary participation. But are there nevertheless alternative routes to ensure a 
degree of parliamentary oversight and control here? We indeed find a rudimentary 
requirement to parliamentary consultation for CFSP matters in Article 36 TEU. The 
provision states (emphasis added): “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common 
security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure 
that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special 
representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament. The European 
Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High 
Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the 
common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.” 
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Article 36 TEU stipulates parliamentary consultation for the “main” aspects and the 
“basic” choices within the Union’s foreign and security policy – a constitutional 
limitation that consequently excludes Parliament from shedding light on the devils in the 
details. The inability to be consulted on individual foreign policy measures equally erodes 
the obligation imposed on the High Representative to ensure that the position of the 
European Parliament is “duly taken into consideration”. Indeed: the right of 
“consultation” in Article 36 TEU boils down to a right of “information”; and until 2006, 
it was not even clear whether this was a right to be informed in advance. In the absence of 
real oversight rights, it is therefore hardly surprising that Parliament also lacks direct 
control rights over CFSP agreements. The only indirect control it might here exert is 
through the – blunt – medium of budgetary control. For expenditure arising under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy will generally be charged to the Union budget; and 
this has given the European Parliament at least some control over the – basic – foreign 
affairs choices of the European Union.  
 
 
c. Executive Agreements: The Treaty Powers of the Commission  
 
Does Article 218 TFEU constitute the Union’s exclusive treaty-making procedure; or has 
the European Union – like the United States – devised alternative procedures for the 
making of international agreements? Within the Union legal order, this question has 
primarily arisen with regard to whether there exists a procedure for executive agreements, 
and in particular: Commission agreements.  
Will the European Commission – the Union’s supranational executive – enjoy inherent 
treaty powers, like the U.S. President; and/or, can the Council delegate treaty powers to 
the Commission? The European Treaties (and their Protocols) provide ambivalent 
signals as to the Commission’s treaty powers. The EU Treaties indeed do contain a small 
number of provisions that expressly entitle the Commission with the power to conclude 
international agreements on its own authority. For example: Article 220 TFEU (partly) 
charges the Commission to establish and maintain relations with international 
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organizations; and this competence is said to entail the power to conclude executive 
agreements (Kokott, 2012).7  
But more importantly: has the EU legal order followed U.S. American constitutionalism 
and generally confirmed the existence of parallel external powers of Union executive? 
This question came before the European Court of Justice in France v Commission 
(European Court of Justice, 1994). France had brought annulment proceedings against 
an international agreement concluded by the Commission with the United States. The 
purpose of the administrative agreement was to promote cooperation in the field of 
competition law; and the French Government had claimed that the Commission was not 
competent to conclude this agreement, as this power was not expressly conferred onto 
the Commission, and that it was consequently reserved to the Council. The Commission 
counterclaimed that it could generally “negotiate and conclude agreements or contracts 
whose implementation does not require action by the Council” (ibid., para.31); and since 
this was the case in the field of competition law, the cooperation agreement fell within 
the scope of its executive powers.  
The Court has roundly rejected this argument (ibid, para.41): “Even if the Commission 
has the power, internally, to take individual decisions applying the rules of competition, a 
field covered by the Agreement, that internal power is not such as to alter the allocation 
of powers between the [Union] institutions with regard to the conclusion of international 
agreements, which is determine by Article [218] of the Treaty.” The Court here refused 
to derive external treaty powers from the internal executive powers of the Commission. 
Unlike American constitutionalism, EU constitutionalism has thus not adopted the idea 
of parallel external powers belonging to the executive by reason of its (internal) 
administrative powers.  
Can the Union nonetheless delegate international treaty powers to the Commission? 
While constitutionally possible, the Union seems to have made little use of this option in 
its constitutional practice. All delegations of treaty power to the Commission must 
moreover concern on-political questions. This absolute limitation follows from the 
constitutional frame given to the “delegation doctrine” in the Union legal order (Schütze, 
2015: 309-327).   
                                                        
7 For illustrations of these administrative agreements, see only: Exchange of letters between the European 
Communities and the International Labour Organisation, (1990) OJ C 24/06); as well as: Exchange of 
Letters between the World Health Organisation and the Commission of the European Communities 
concerning the consolidation and intensification of cooperation, (2001) OJ C 1/7. 
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Conclusions (and Comparisons) 
 
Classic constitutional thought traditionally considered the treaty power to fall within the 
executive’s exclusive domain. The conclusion of international treaties was here said to 
demand secrecy and efficiency – two characteristics that counselled against parliamentary 
participation. This nineteenth-century logic however hardly convinces in the twenty-first 
century. For the function of international treaties has shifted from the military to the 
regulatory domain; and in the wake of this “new internationalism”, the classic divide 
between “internal” and “external” affairs has increasingly disappeared.  
Has the enlarged scope of the treaty power trigger a transformation of its nature? Has the 
rise of “legislative” international treaties been compensated by a greater role accorded to 
parliaments? It is undoubtedly “a remarkable feature in all States that the democratic 
process with regard to foreign affairs is infinitely slower, and always less complete, than 
within domestic affairs” (Rumpf, 1965: 111-115 – my translation). This article has 
explored this slow process comparatively by looking at the constitutional law of the 
United States and the European Union.  
Section 1 started by analyzing the democratic credentials of the treaty power in the 
United States. While the Kantian plea for parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs 
was here heeded with regard to the power to declare war, it was – ironically – not heard in 
relation to the treaty power. For as we saw above, the US constitutional order originally 
excluded the House of Representative from the negotiation and conclusion of all 
international treaties. According to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the treaty power 
belonged to the President and the Senate; and for a long time, the exclusion of the House 
of Representatives was the “undemocratic anachronism” of the U.S. foreign affairs 
system (Henkin, 1996: 217). It has been partially remedied by the rise of the 
congressional-executive agreement (CEA). Indeed: from an internal perspective, the 
CEA fully democratizes the treaty power because it is concluded on the basis of the 
“ordinary” legislative procedure set out in Article I of the Constitution. However, the 
scope of the CEA has remained limited; and even more importantly: the spectacular rise 
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of presidential agreements in the twentieth century has dramatically undermined 
parliamentary involvement in the conclusion of international agreements.  
Section 2 analyzed the democratic credentials of the treaty power in the European 
Union. We saw here that the Union started out from a position similar to that of Article 
II of the U.S. Constitution: the conclusion of international treaties was left to the 
Commission – the Union’s supranational executive – and the Council representing the 
Member States. With the rise of the European Parliament in the domestic sphere, this 
exclusion became increasingly problematic; and subsequent constitutional amendments 
have thus regularly increased its powers in the external sphere. Today, the European 
Parliament must indeed give its consent to the majority of international treaties 
concluded by the Union. The main exception to this rule are agreements concluded 
under the CFSP title; yet CFSP agreements will generally lack direct effects within the 
Union legal order and will thus not constitute “external legislation”.  
From a comparative perspective, what is the more democratic constitutional arrangement 
– the US or the EU solution? Qualitatively, the procedure under Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution is undoubtedly less democratic than the procedure under Article 218 
TFEU. The exception here concerns CFSP agreement; yet even there, the – direct – 
legitimation brought by the Senate under Article II is arguably smaller then the – indirect 
– democratic credentials of the Council under Article 218 TFEU;8 and in the majority of 
cases, the American President is likely to conclude the American counterpart of “CFSP 
agreements” as sole executive agreements.9 By contrast, when compared to the Article I 
procedure for congressional-executive agreement, the treaty-making procedure under 
Article 218 TFEU is less democratic than its American counterpart. For while the former 
                                                        
8 There are two elements to this point – one relating to the composition, the other to the function of the 
Senate/Council. First, and in terms of their respective composition, the Council of Ministers seems better 
to reflect the democratic idea of proportionate representation than the Senate. For even if the Senators are 
(since 1913) directly elected, each State – the biggest as much as the smallest one – will have two Senators. 
The composition of the Senate thus follows the federal idea of the “sovereign equality” of the States, 
instead of the democratic idea of “one person, one vote”. By contrast, thanks to its system of weighted 
votes, the Council has traditionally represented not so much the Member States but rather their national 
peoples.  Second, and in terms of their respective functions, the Council appears also more involved in the 
treaty-making process than the Senate (cf. E. Stein & L. Henkin, 1986): 42): “In comparison with the 
American system, the Council performs the Senate’s original function of “advice” on on-going 
negotiations (albeit with a mandatory effect), the Senate’s “consent” role, as well as the President’s function 
of “making” the treaty.”).  
9 For even if the President is (in)directly elected, this will not provide executive agreements with much 
democratic legitimacy, cf. O. Hathaway (2009-10: 224): “Even if the electorate were informed about 
executive agreements, however, a presidential election is an extremely blunt toot for accountability. The 
voters may disagree with the international lawmaking of a President, but vote for him because they 
approve of his handling of, say, the economy – an issue on which they hold more intense preferences.”  
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gives full parliamentary participation, Article 218 TFEU generally reduces parliamentary 
involvement to “consent. Yet again: the fast-track procedure for Article I agreements 
has, in the past, equally reduced Congressional involvement to a mere take-it-or-leave-it 
choice.  
What comparative conclusions can therefore be drawn? When judged by their respective 
“internal” standards, both the American and the European treaty powers suffer from a 
“democratic deficit”. For the American system, this deficit principally stems from the 
Article II procedure and the widespread use of sole executive agreements. For the 
European system, this deficit derives from Parliament’s lack of co-conclusion rights for 
treaties that fall into areas that internally require co-decision. When seen from an external 
perspective, however, the European Union treaty power appears to be more democratic 
than its American counterpart. This results from the – quantitatively – dramatic shift 
towards executive agreements in US foreign affairs. This shift has been said to “rest[] on 
a mistaken assumption that less democratic international lawmaking is more effective 
international lawmaking” (Hathaway, 2009-10: 147). But the dichotomy between 
“democracy” and “efficiency” may indeed turn out to be a false one; and in any event: a 
democratic extra-effort might be a price worth paying to legitimize “legislative” treaty-
making in the twenty-first century.   
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